“Evolutionary Games and Matching Rules” New working paper (March 2018),
Working Paper 2017:11, Department of Economics, Lund University, 2017.
(old WP under the title “Evolutionary Games with Group Selection”) (Revisions requested by the International Journal of Game Theory)
Joint with Martin Kaae Jensen
Other Work in Progress
In markets for credence goods, better-informed sellers can take advantage of less-informed buyers by providing unnecessary services (overtreatment). This paper considers heterogeneously informed customers who can signal their expertise to an expert. We show how the incentive to signal ones expertise depends on the type of language available to buyers. We consider the cases of i) no language (where the customer cannot send any message), ii) hard evidence (where the customer can choose to disclose or hide information he has but cannot try to fake expertise), and iii) full language/cheap talk (where all messages can be sent by all types). Our results show that, under ii) and iii), full efficiency (i.e. no overtreatment) can be achieved in pooling equilibria where informed customers choose to conceal all of their information. Under ii), they can also choose to partially reveal their information, in which case the uninformed customers are the only ones who may be overtreated. Interestingly, in all other cases, partially informed customers are at least weakly better off hiding their information.
“Can social group-formation norms influence behavior? An experimental Study” [Slides](please view slides in presentation mode)
We investigate experimentally the impact of different group formation norms expressed by constant-index-of-assortativity matching rules. We implement a random matching rule as well as an assortative matching rule in a 12-player Hawk-Dove game setting. We test whether the different matching rule implementation affects participant behavior. Our findings suggest that increased assortativity induces lower aggression levels which is consistent with theoretical predictions. More than that, we get evidence of slow convergence towards equilibrium behavior. We also computationally evaluate the predictions of several learning models through simulations.
“Coordination and Information Acquisition: An Experiment”
Joint with Maxim Goryunov